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drop in culprit identifications. Critically, and as predicted, degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions
also led to a sharp increase in the identification of innocent persons. These results suggest that when a lineup
procedure gives a witness a weak match-to-memory experience, the witness will lower her criterion for
making an affirmative identification decision. This pattern of results is troubling because it suggests that
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Abstract 
We examined how giving eyewitnesses a weak recognition experience impacts their 
identification decisions. In two experiments we forced a weak recognition experience for 
lineups by impairing either encoding or retrieval conditions. In Experiment 1 (N = 245), 
undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to watch either a clear or a degraded 
culprit video and then viewed either a culprit-present or culprit-removed lineup 
identification procedure. In Experiment 2 (N = 227), all participants watched the same 
clear culprit video but were then randomly assigned to either view a clear or noise-
degraded lineup procedure. Half of the participants viewed a culprit-present lineup 
procedure and the remaining participants viewed a culprit-removed lineup procedure. Not 
surprisingly degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions led to a sharp drop in 
culprit identifications. Critically, and as predicted, degrading either encoding or retrieval 
conditions also led to a sharp increase in the identification of innocent persons. These 
results suggest that when a lineup procedure gives a witness a weak match-to-memory 
experience, the witness will lower her criterion for making an affirmative identification 
decision. This pattern of results is troubling because it suggests that witnesses who 
encounter lineups that do not include the culprit might have a tendency to use a lower 
criterion for identification than do witnesses who encounter lineups that actually include 
the culprit.   
Keywords: eyewitness identification, decision criterion, mistaken identification, lineups, 
strength-based mirror effect 
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Public Significance Statement: Eyewitnesses lowered their criterion for making an 
affirmative identification from a culprit-absent lineup when either the witnessing 
(encoding) or testing (retrieval) conditions were made to be poor. This research helps us 
understand why eyewitnesses often make affirmative identification decisions under weak 
memory conditions rather than backing away from making any identification at all. We 
posit that any condition that leads to an eyewitness having a weak recognition response to 
a lineup, including the mere absence of culprit in the lineup, will result in eyewitnesses 
using a lowered criterion for making an affirmative decision.  
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Mistaken Eyewitness Identification Rates Increase 
When Either Witnessing or Testing Conditions Get Worse 
Since the mid- to late-1970s eyewitness scientists have learned a great deal about 
the variables that increase or decrease the chances of mistaken identification, but there is 
a fundamental question about mistaken eyewitness identification that has lurked in the 
background receiving little attention. Specifically, why do eyewitnesses mistakenly 
identify innocent persons? Cases of coincidental resemblance are seemingly rare, and 
while social influence is certainly a contributing factor, there are numerous laboratory 
examples of witnesses mistakenly identifying innocent persons who only fit a general 
description of the culprit under conditions that are devoid of any social influence 
whatsoever (see Wells, Yang, & Smalarz, 2015). We assume here that, if an eyewitness 
identifies an innocent person under these relatively optimal lineup conditions, then that 
eyewitness must have a relatively weak memory for the culprit. Although it is easy to 
understand that an eyewitness with a weak memory might not be able to identify the 
culprit, why would an eyewitness with such a weak memory pick anyone out of a lineup? 
The current studies seek to explain this troubling eyewitness behavior.  
The propensity for eyewitnesses to make identifications from lineups when they 
should “back off” is readily evident in eyewitness identification experiments. Across 94 
eyewitness identification studies, 21% of eyewitnesses picked an innocent person when 
the culprit was in the lineup and 48% picked an innocent person (rather than make no 
identification) when the culprit was not in the lineup (Wells, Yang, & Smalarz, 2015). 
These types of results are obtained in eyewitness identification experiments even when 
witnesses are warned that the culprit might not be present and are explicitly permitted to 
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make no identification. Clearly, these witnesses did not have sufficient memory strength 
to perform well, but rather than back off and make no identification, they made mistaken 
identifications.  
The propensity of eyewitnesses to make identifications despite weak memories is 
not just a laboratory phenomenon. There are now eleven published field studies 
examining the outcomes of lineups involving eyewitnesses to serious crimes in actual 
cases (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Behrman & Richards, 2005; Horry, Halford, Brewer, 
Milne, & Bull, 2014; Horry, Memon, Wright, & Milne, 2012; Klobuchar, Steblay, & 
Claigiuri, 2006; Memon, et al., 2011; Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 2003; Wells, 
Steblay, & Dysart, 2015; Wixted et al., 2015; Wright & McDaid, 1996; Wright & 
Skagerberg, 2007). Collectively, these eleven studies examined the outcomes of 6,734 
lineups (Wells, 2018). Eyewitnesses identified someone in 65% of these lineups, but 37% 
of their identifications were of known-innocent fillers. Granted, eyewitnesses often have 
poor views, and feel stress or fear at the time of witnessing. Days, weeks, or sometimes 
months go by before eyewitnesses have the opportunity to view a lineup. But, if these 
witnesses to serious crimes possess such a weak memory that there is more than a one-
third chance that they will point to an innocent person, then what process leads these 
witnesses to make an identification at all rather than exercise the option of making no 
identification?  
We offer what, at first glance, appears to be a surprising answer to the question of 
why eyewitnesses make affirmative identifications from lineups even though memory is 
weak. Specifically, we argue that these affirmative identifications are made not despite 
weak memory but because of weak memory. Specifically, we argue that a weak 
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recognition memory experience leads eyewitnesses to adopt a lower decision criterion 
(i.e., require a weaker match to memory in order to make an affirmative identification 
decision).  
It is easy to understand how the probability of a hit (identifying the culprit from a 
culprit-present lineup) would go down when memory conditions are weaker. But why 
should the probability of false alarm (identifying an innocent person from a culprit-absent 
lineup) increase when memory gets weaker?  
The basic memory literature, using repeated-measures word-memory experiments 
rather than single-trial eyewitness identification lineups, has shown that poorer encoding 
conditions lead to more false alarms than do better encoding conditions. This 
phenomenon has been the topic of some debate in the basic recognition literature (e.g., 
Criss, 2009; Starns, White, & Ratcliff, 2012). The dominant explanation for this 
phenomenon is that poor encoding conditions lead individuals to change their decision 
strategy (e.g., Wixted & Gaitan, 2002). Specifically, when memory is relatively weak, 
people tend to lower the amount of evidence they require before they make an affirmative 
response so as to avoid missing the opportunity to make a hit (Wixted & Gaitan, 2002). 
The finding that relatively-impoverished encoding conditions lead to both a decrease in 
hits and an increase in false alarms is commonly referred to as the strength-based mirror 
effect (e.g., Stretch & Wixted, 1998).  
Additional research from the basic recognition literature suggests that varying the 
quality or quantity of cues at recognition can also produce a strength-based mirror effect 
(Hockley, Hemsworth, & Consoli, 1999; Kent, Lamberts, & Patton, 2018). Hockley et al. 
(1999, Experiment 1) had participants study a series of undisguised, to-be-remembered 
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faces (targets). Half of the faces during the recognition test were targets and the 
remaining were novel (not-previously-seen) faces. The critical manipulation was whether 
the faces were disguised (i.e., wearing sunglasses) during the recognition test. The results 
showed that participants made fewer hits and also more false alarms when the persons 
depicted in the test photos were wearing sunglasses. Again, the reduction in hits from 
putting sunglasses on the faces at test is easy to understand. But why should putting 
sunglasses on novel faces increase false alarms? Again, the prevailing view is that when 
the recognition cues are relatively weak, people tend to lower the amount of evidence 
they require before they can make an affirmative response so as to avoid missing the 
opportunity to make a hit. 
A critical question is whether the strength-based mirror effect generalizes to the 
eyewitness-lineup context. Basic memory researchers have studied the strength-based 
mirror effect in the context of repeated-measures old/new recognition tasks. On an 
old/new recognition task, participants study a series of items at encoding (e.g., words, 
faces) and at recognition each trial includes either an “old” item that the participant 
studied at encoding or a “new” item that the participant did not study at encoding. On 
each trial, the participant is tasked with determining whether the item is “old” or “new”. 
While the old/new recognition task has obvious similarities to the typical eyewitness 
lineup task, there are also important differences. One potentially important difference is 
that on an eyewitness lineup, the eyewitness views an array of faces. An eyewitness with 
a relatively weak memory would presumably have more difficulty determining which 
lineup member provides the best match-to-memory; and, to the extent that an eyewitness 
finds it difficult to even form a preference, the eyewitness might decide not to make an 
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identification, which is an option they are explicitly given with a lineup. This idea is 
consistent with a host of relative judgment strategies that have been implemented in the 
WITNESS model (e.g., Clark, Erickson, & Breneman, 2011). With these relative-
judgment strategies an eyewitness only identifies the best-matching lineup member if that 
lineup member is a sufficiently better match-to-memory than are the other lineup 
members. But if an eyewitness has a relatively weak match-to-memory, then the 
eyewitness should have difficulty forming a preference and the probability of a lineup 
rejection should increase. Thus, given the inconsistencies with other theories, it is not 
entirely clear that the strength-based mirror effect will generalize to the eyewitness 
context.  
In our review of past work in the eyewitness literature, we found a few examples 
in which weaker encoding conditions led not only to a decrease in hits, but also to an 
increase in false alarms. Longer distances at encoding, shorter exposure times, and the 
presence of a disguise have all been shown to both decrease hits and increase false alarms 
(e.g., Lampinen, Erickson, Moore, & Hittson, 2014; Mansour et al., 2012; Memon, Hope, 
& Bull, 2003). Importantly, however, none of these experiments were specifically 
designed to examine the strength-based mirror effect, or attempted to find out why false 
alarms increase when match-to-memory is weak. Instead, in each case, the authors were 
focused on investigating different applied problems and their experiments happened to 
produce effects that fit the mirror-effect pattern. In the present work, we predicted the 
mirror-effect pattern a priori and specifically designed our experiments to develop a 
better understanding of the conditions that produce mirror effects and why these 
conditions lead to increases in false alarms. 
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If the strength-based mirror effect generalizes to the eyewitness literature, the 
finding that a lack of high-quality recognition cues at test leads to an increase in false 
alarms is particularly concerning (Hockley et al., 1999; Kent et al., 2018). Presumably 
concealing or degrading cues at test increases false alarms for the same reason that 
impoverished encoding conditions increase false alarms—when match-to-memory is 
weak, participants lower the amount of evidence they require to make an affirmative 
response because they do not want to miss an opportunity to make a hit (Wixted & 
Gaitan, 2002). This does not necessarily mean that participants value hits more than they 
do correct rejections. To the contrary, if a witness wanted to strike some balance between 
missing a hit and making a false alarm (missing a correct rejection), maintaining that 
balance would require the witness to lower her decision criteria for a weaker match-to-
memory experience. As match-to-memory weakens, hits are going to go down, so in 
order to maintain the same balance between misses and false alarms, the participant will 
need to lower her criterion for making an affirmative response.  
Why should eyewitness scientists be concerned that a lack of high-quality cues at 
recognition can lead people to require less evidence in order to make an affirmative 
recognition decision? Consider the difference between culprit-present and culprit-absent 
identification procedures. Clearly when the culprit is present in an identification 
procedure, the quality and quantity of cues available to the eyewitness will be better than 
when the culprit is absent from the identification procedure. And, whether a lack of high-
quality cues is due to poor encoding conditions, poor retrieval conditions, or the mere 
absence of the culprit, eyewitnesses are likely to respond in the same manner—by 
lowering their standard for a face to be identified as the culprit (an affirmative response). 
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This reasoning recently led to the development of a provocative new hypothesis: culprit 
present-absent criteria discrepancy (Smith, Wells, Lindsay, & Myerson, 2018).  
 The culprit present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis begins with the non-
controversial observation that witnesses who encounter a culprit-absent lineup will tend 
to have a weaker match-to-memory experience than will witnesses who encounter a 
culprit-present lineup. Because match-to-memory is weaker for the culprit-absent 
eyewitnesses, they will also shift their standards to require less evidence to make an 
affirmative identification than will culprit-present eyewitnesses.The result is that present-
absent criteria discrepancy undermines identification performance. Indeed, if witnesses 
who encounter culprit-absent procedures tend to require less evidence for an affirmative 
identification than do witnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures, this will lead 
to the same number of culprit identifications but more innocent identifications than if 
culprit-absent participants used the same criteria as culprit-present participants (Smith et 
al., 2018). This happens because witnesses who are encountering innocent suspects are 
lowering their standards for making an affirmative identification, but witnesses 
encountering guilty suspects are not.  
Clearly, culprit present-absent discrepancy hypothesis does not posit that 
witnesses are aware that the culprit is absent and lower their criteria for that reason. After 
all, if they were aware that the culprit was absent, they would reject the lineup. Instead, 
the culprit present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis says that when witnesses 
encounter a culprit-absent lineup they experience difficulty because there is not a strong 
match to memory. This experience is very similar to having poor encoding and so they 
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adjust their decision criteria downward to help ensure that they will not miss the 
opportunity to identify the culprit.  
In one sense, the culprit present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis involves a 
misattribution process. Specifically, although it is the absence of the culprit that is 
causing the weak experience of match to memory, the eyewitness attributes the difficulty 
to other things, such as poor viewing conditions or not having paid close attention during 
witnessing. In fact, there is evidence supporting this misattribution process. When 
witnesses encounter a randomly-assigned culprit-absent lineup they report having had a 
worse view and having paid less attention to the culprit than when they encounter a 
randomly-assigned culprit-present lineup  (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002). In other 
words, witnesses misattributed their difficulty picking out the culprit to having had a poor 
view and having not paid close attention at encoding rather than to the actual reason for 
their difficulty picking the out the culprit, namely the absence of the culprit in the lineup.  
In the present work, we directly examined how manipulating match-to-memory 
impacts eyewitness performance. We manipulated match-to-memory in two ways. In the 
first experiment, we manipulated the encoding experience, giving witnesses either a good 
view of the culprit or an impoverished view. In the second experiment, all witnesses had 
a good view of the culprit, but we made the recognition experience weak at the retrieval 
stage by adding noise to the lineup images. Neither of these experiments is intended to 
directly test the present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis. Rather, these experiments 
address two important questions related to the present-absent criteria discrepancy 
hypothesis. First, does the strength-based mirror effect generalize to the eyewitness-
lineup context? As already noted above, there are reasons to believe that the strength-
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based mirror effect will not generalize to the eyewitness context. Certainly, degraded 
encoding or testing conditions will lead to a reduction in culprit identifications, but the 
critical question is whether these degradations also increase the identification of innocent 
persons. Because the present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis is a special case of 
the more general strength-based mirror effect, it is first necessary to establish that the 
strength-based mirror effect generalizes to the eyewitness-lineup context. If the strength-
based mirror effect does not generalize to the eyewitness context, then there is no basis 
for the present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis. 
Second, is witness-criterion placement influenced by the match-to-memory 
experience at the time of the identification procedure? The present-absent criteria 
discrepancy hypothesis predicts that, compared to witnesses who encounter guilty 
suspects, witnesses who encounter innocent suspects will respond to the weaker match-
to-memory experience by lowering their criterion for making an affirmative 
identification. The linchpin assumption of this hypothesis is that witness-criterion 
placement is influenced by the match-to-memory experience during the identification 
task. Indeed, because culprit-present and culprit-absent witnesses have identical 
experiences up until the identification task, the present-absent criteria discrepancy effect 
could only occur if witness-criterion placement is influenced by the match-to-memory 
experience during the identification task itself. By giving all witnesses the same viewing 
conditions and manipulating the quality of lineup photos, Experiment 2 directly tests the 
assumption that witness-criterion placement can be influenced by the match-to-memory 
experience at the time of the identification test. In other words, if degrading the quality of 
the photos in Experiment 2 results in witnesses lowering their decision criteria, then this 
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is critical evidence that witness criterion placement can be influenced by their experience 
on the lineup task. From a theoretical perspective, the idea that witnesses’ decision 
criteria are malleable during the lineup task is a key assumption of the culprit present-
absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis. Hence, although this work does not directly test 
the culprit present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis, Experiment 2 tests one of the 
critical assumpritions of the hypothesis.  
Clearly, degrading either the encoding conditions (Experiment 1) or the retrieval 
conditions (Experiment 2) will reduce accurate identifications from culprit-present 
lineups. The critical question, however, concerns what happens in culprit-absent lineups. 
Our prediction is that degrading either encoding conditions or retrieval conditions will 
result in an increase in false alarms in culprit-absent conditions. The latter result would 
indicate that degraded memory conditions result in eyewitnesses lowering their decision 
criteria. Importantly, finding that degraded recognition conditions lead to an increase in 
false alarms would also demonstrate that eyewitness decision criteria are malleable 
during the lineup task.  
Before proceeding to our first experiment, it is important that we clarify why we 
are relying only on false alarm rates for making inferences about decision criterion in 
these experiments. Inferences about decision criterion (the amount of information a 
witness requires to make an affirmative response) in eyewitness identification 
experiments are sometimes made on the basis of examining witness response biases, 
which are measured using one of two statistics (c or β) calculated on the basis of both hits 
and false alarms (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). But, when one is looking at 
strength-based mirror effects, as we are doing here, using culprit-present conditions to 
WEAK MEMORY LEADS WITNESSES TO LOWER THEIR CRITERIA	 14	
examine decision criterion is not appropriate (e.g., Verde & Rotello, 2007). This is 
because choosing in culprit-present conditions is confounded with the strength of the 
memory signal coming from the culprit. Indeed, our prediction is that the weaker of our 
two memory conditions will lead to (1) worse discriminability and (2) a more lenient 
decision criterion (Wixted & Gaitan, 2002). The culprit-present condition confounds 
these two counteractive forces. Whereas a more lenient decision criterion should lead to 
an increase in choosing, worse discriminability should lead to a drop in choosing. Hence, 
it is entirely possible (likely even) that the procedure with the more lenient decision 
criterion (viz. the weaker memory condition) could lead to less choosing in the culprit-
present lineup. The result is that, culprit-present data should not be included when 
making inferences about decision criteria. To the contrary, false alarm rates are solely 
influenced by criterion placement (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), so when looking at 
strength-based mirror effects, false-alarm rates offer a cleaner measure of decision 
criteria than do other measures of response bias (c or β).1 
Experiment 1: Weakening the Recognition Experience at Encoding 
Experiment 1 Method 
The Institutional Review Board for human research at a large Midwestern 
University approved this experiment.  
Participants and Design. Two-hundred and forty-five undergraduate students 
participated in exchange for course credits. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
1 Those who have fit signal detection models to data are well aware that the predicted false alarm rate is 
equal to ϕ(-c), where ϕ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution and c refers to the decision criterion (e.g., 
Dunn, 2010). Hence, signal detection models assume that an observed false alarm rate is solely influenced 
by the decision criterion. 
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one cell of a 2 (good view of culprit, poor view of culprit) x 2 (culprit-present lineup, 
culprit-removed lineup) between-participants factorial design2. 
We chose to use a sample size of 60 per cell and then conducted pilot testing 
using a culprit-present lineup to find a level of degradation in the video that would reduce 
accurate identifications enough to be statistically significant at a nominal alpha level of 
.05 with a sample size of 60 per cell. None of the data presented in this paper are from the 
initial pilot testing as the pilot testing was only used to determine the level of degradation 
that was required to significantly reduce culprit identifications with our desired sample 
size. Screen shots of the close-up view for the clear and degraded videos are shown in 
Figure 1.  
Materials. 
Culprit Videos. Each participant was presented with one of two versions of the 
same culprit video (still frames from the two versions of this video are depicted in Figure 
1). Half of the participants viewed a relatively high-resolution culprit video in which the 
culprit's facial features were clearly visible. In this version of the video, participants 
watched a video of a scene from an airport that showed six people standing in a check-in 
line, each with a small suitcase. At one point, the second person in the line begins 
checking for his airline ticket and, not immediately finding it, allows two people to go 
ahead of him. While others are looking away, he switches his similar-looking suitcase 
with the third person. Shortly thereafter, the bag switcher leaves the line, walking toward 
the camera for a very good camera view of his face, and exits. The total amount of time 
that the bag-switcher was in view was 45 seconds. Five of those seconds were close-up 
2 Additional conditions were run in this experiment that gave witnesses the option of responding “not sure” 
rather than making either an identification or rejection decision. These participants were not included in 
this manuscript. See supplemental materials for an analysis including these participants.  
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views of his face. The remaining participants viewed a relatively low-resolution version 
of the same culprit video in which it was more difficult to make out the culprit's facial 
features. In order to create the low-resolution culprit video, we increased the brightness 
of that video to the extent that it was difficult to make out the culprit's facial features (see 
Figure 1).  
Lineups. Half of the participants viewed a 6-person culprit-present lineup in 
which the culprit was surrounded by five known-innocent fillers who generally fit the 
culprit's description. To create our culprit-absent lineups, we used the removal-without-
replacement method (Wells, 1993). Hence, participants in the culprit-absent condition 
viewed a 5-person lineup that included only the fillers from the culprit-present lineup. In 
our opinion, the removal-without-replacement method offers a cleaner test of the 
hypotheses tested in the current experiments than does the alternative culprit-absent 
procedure in which the culprit is replaced by another person (i.e., a designated innocent 
suspect).  This is because the traditional replacement method changes two things at once, 
namely removing the culprit and also bringing in a totally new lineup member to replace 
the culprit. The effects on witness responding of adding this new lineup member can be 
Figure 1. Screen shot examples from the clear and degraded videos in Experiment 1. 
     Screen shot from clear video   Screen shot from degraded video 
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complex and depend on a variety of similarity relations between the new lineup member 
and the culprit, as well as the new lineup member and the other lineup members. The 
removal-without-replacement method, however, is a purer test of our hypotheses because 
witness responses can be more clearly attributed to the mere absence of the culprit.  
We selected lineup fillers based on their similarity to the culprit. The culprit 
always appeared in position 5 (bottom middle) of the 2 x 3 lineup array. We did not 
assess lineup fairness a priori. Rather, we assessed resultant lineup fairness (Wells, 
2019) or the fairness that was actually achieved in our culprit-absent lineup conditions. 
Resultant lineup fairness can be calculated in the same ways as traditional lineup fairness, 
but instead of using a mock-witness task – which may or may not provide an accurate 
estimate of fairness on the actual lineup task – one applies the lineup fairness measure 
directly to the experimental lineup data. To calculate resultant lineup fairness, we 
calculated the resultant E' (Tredoux, 1998) achieved for the culprit-absent lineup. 
Tredoux's (1998) E' varies from 1 to k where k is the total number of lineup members; 
hence, in the present experiment, Tredoux's E' could range from 1 to 5. For participants in 
the clear-view condition, E' was equal to 3.31 and for participants in the poor-view 
condition, E' was equal to 3.18. Hence, our culprit-absent lineups were moderately fair. 
Note that resultant lineup fairness is only applicable to culprit-absent lineups. Indeed, 
when the culprit is present in the lineup, resultant lineup fairness is strongly affected by 
the extent to which the culprit matches the eyewitness' memory for the culprit and hence, 
it is not a good measure of fairness for culprit-present conditions. 
Procedure. Prior to viewing the culprit video, participants were told that the 
study concerned how people form impressions of other people. After viewing the video, 
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participants were told that we wanted them to view a lineup to see if they could identify 
the person who switched the bag. All participants were warned that the actual culprit 
might or might not be in the lineup and were given an explicit option of making no 
identification. Participants were then shown a photo-lineup that included the culprit 
embedded among five innocent people or viewed a lineup with only the five innocent 
people (the removal-without-replacement method of creating a culprit-absent lineup, 
Wells, 1993).  
After making an identification decision, participants were asked to indicate how 
confident they were in their decision on a scale from 0% to 100% in 10% increments. All 
participants were then debriefed fully about the methods and purpose of the experiment, 
given their course credit, and dismissed.  
Experiment 1 Results 
Table 1 displays the proportions of witnesses who identified the culprit, an 
innocent person, or made no identification as functions of culprit-presence and video-
degradation conditions.  
Identification decision accuracy. We first assessed the impact of video quality, 
culprit-presence, and the interaction term on identification decision accuracy using 
hierarchical binary logistic regression analysis. When the culprit is present, the correct 
decision is to identify that individual and both filler identifications and rejections are 
incorrect decisions. When the culprit is absent, the correct decision is to reject the lineup 
and falsely identifying anyone from the lineup is an incorrect decision. Hence, for the 
purpose of this model, both culprit identifications and correct rejections were coded as 
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accurate responses (accurate = 1) and all other responses were coded as inaccurate 
(inaccurate = 0).  
Neither culprit-presence nor the interaction term significantly predicted 
identification accuracy, Bs ≤ .55, SEs ≥ .29, Wald’s χ2(1) ≤ 1.58, ps ≥ .21, eB ≤ 1.74.  
Identification accuracy did vary by video-quality; the odds ratio for accurate 
identifications decisions was 6.69 times greater for the clear versus the degraded video, B 
= 1.90, SE = .29, Wald’s χ2(1) = 42.44, p < .001, eB = 6.69, (95% CI [3.78, 11.86]). 
Although the interaction term was not significant, our prediction was that degraded 
encoding conditions would decrease accuracy in both culprit-present and culprit-absent 
identification procedures. Accordingly, we proceeded to examine the simple slopes of 
encoding conditions as a function of culprit presence. When the culprit was present, the 
odds ratio for accurate-identification decisions was 8.34 times greater for the clear versus 
the degraded video, B = 2.18, SE = .42, Wald’s χ2(1) = 26.90, p <.001, eB = 8.34, (95% CI 
[3.88, 20.13]). In the culprit-removed condition, the odds ratio for culprit-removed 
accurate-identification decisions was 5.07 times greater for the clear versus degraded 
video, B = 1.62, SE = .41, Wald’s χ2(1) = 16.05, p <.001, eB = 5.07, (95% CI [2.29, 
11.23]). 
Analyses of type of error in culprit-present conditions. Because there are two 
ways in which a participant viewing the culprit-present condition can make an error (a 
false rejection or a mistaken identification of an innocent person), we next examined 
whether false rejections and mistaken identifications from culprit-present lineups differed 
as a function of video quality. There was a significant effect of video quality on mistaken 
identifications in the culprit-present conditions; the odds ratio for culprit-present 
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mistaken identifications of innocent persons was 8.34 times greater for the degraded 
versus the clear video, B = 3.41, SE = 1.04, Wald’s χ2(1) = 10.70, p =.001, eB = 30.22, 
(95% CI [3.91, 233.64]).  Likewise, the odds ratio for culprit-present false rejections was 
2.36 times greater for the degraded versus the clear video, B = .86, SE =.42, Wald’s χ2(1) 
= 4.25, p = .04, eB = 2.36, (95% CI [1.04, 5.33]). 
Table 1. Identification decisions in Experiment 1: Clear vs. degraded encoding conditions 
Clear video Degraded video 
Culprit-
present 
Culprit ID 78.3% 29.0% 
Innocent ID 1.7% 33.8% 
No ID 20.0% 37.1% 
Culprit-
removed 
Innocent ID 21.0% 57.4% 
No ID 79.0% 42.6% 
Confidence. We used a hierarchical binary logistic regression analysis to examine 
whether confidence could discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identification 
decisions and whether this effect was dependent on the presence of the culprit, the quality 
of viewing conditions, or the three-way interaction term. As eyewitness confidence 
increased, so to did the odds of making a correct identification decision, B = 0.18, SE = 
0.06, Wald's χ2(1) = 8.92, p = .003, eB = 1.20, (95% CI [1.07, 1.36]). Importantly, the 
three-way interaction among confidence, viewing conditions, and culprit presence was 
not significant, B = 0.03, SE = 0.27, Wald's χ2(1) = 0.12, p = .91, eB = 1.03, (95% CI 
[0.61, 1.74]); however, the discriminative properties of eyewitness confidence were 
dependent on both the quality of viewing conditions, B = 0.37, SE = 0.13, Wald's χ2(1) = 
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7.92, p = .005, eB = 1.45, (95% CI [1.12, 1.88]) and on the presence of the culprit, B = 
0.28, SE = 0.13, Wald's χ2(1) = 4.62, p = .03, eB = 1.33, (95% CI [1.03, 1.72]). 
To follow up the interaction between confidence and viewing conditions, we 
examined the simple slopes of confidence separately for clear and degraded viewing 
conditions. When viewing conditions were clear, increases in confidence predicted 
increases in accuracy, B = 0.37, SE = 0.10, Wald's χ2(1) = 14.16, p < .001, eB = 1.45, 
(95% CI [1.19, 1.76]); however, when viewing conditions were degraded, confidence was 
not significantly related to accuracy, B = 0.01, SE = 0.08, Wald's χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .95, eB 
= 1.01, (95% CI [0.86, 1.18]). We used the same approach to follow up the significant 
interaction between confidence and culprit presence. When the culprit was present, 
increases in confidence predicted increases in accuracy, B = 0.45, SE = 0.09, Wald's χ2(1) 
= 27.05, p < .001, eB = 1.56, (95% CI [1.32, 1.85]). Likewise, when the culprit was absent 
increases in confidence also predicted increases in accuracy, B = 0.20, SE = 0.07, Wald's 
χ2(1) = 8.66, p = .003, eB = 1.22, (95% CI [1.07, 1.39]); however, the effect size was 
smaller when the culprit was absent than when the culprit was present. 
Experiment 2: Weakening the Recognition Experience at Retrieval 
At what point do eyewitnesses make an adjustment in their decision criteria? One 
possibility is that witnesses set their decision criteria at the time of encoding. In other 
words, in Experiment 1 it is possible witnesses set their decision criteria as soon as they 
realized that they had a good, clear view or a poor, degraded view. But, what if all 
eyewitnesses had the same good, clear encoding experience and then encountered a 
lineup in which the images were either clear or were degraded? Would witnesses adjust 
their criteria downward due to the poor retrieval conditions of a degraded lineup? We 
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hypothesized that regardless of whether the weak recognition memory experience is the 
result of unfavorable encoding conditions or the result of unfavorable retrieval 
conditions, witnesses will lower their decision criterion to avoid missing the chance of 
identifying the culprit.  
Experiment 2 Method 
The Institutional Review Board for human research at a large MidWestern 
University approved this experiment.  
Participants and Design. Two-hundred and twenty-seven people participated in 
exchange for course credits. Each participant was randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 
(noise-degraded lineup, clear lineup) x 2 (culprit-present lineup, culprit-removed lineup) 
factorial design.  
We chose to use a sample size of 55 per cell and then pilot tested the materials to 
find a level of degradation in culprit-present lineup that would reduce accurate 
identifications enough to be statistically significant at p < .05 with a sample size of 55 per 
cell. None of the data presented in this paper are from the initial pilot testing as the pilot 
testing was only used to determine the level of degradation that was required to 
significantly reduce culprit identifications with our desired sample size. The degradation 
was achieved by adding visual noise to the lineup images. The clear and noisy lineups are 
shown in Figure 2 for both the culprit-present and culprit-removed lineups.  
Materials and Procedure. The video in Experiment 2 was the same as the clear 
video used in Experiment 1 except that a new actor served the role of the bag-switcher. 
With the exception of using a different actor as the bag-switching culprit (in the video 
and the lineup) and manipulating the strength of the recognition experience at retrieval 
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(degrading the lineup rather than the video), all materials and procedures were the same 
in Experiment 2 as they were in Experiment 1. 
As in Experiment 1, experimenters selected lineup fillers based on their similarity 
to the culprit. The culprit always appeared in position 2 (top middle) of the 2 x 3 lineup 
array. Also as in Experiment 1, we used resultant E' (Tredoux, 1998) to assess the actual 
lineup fairness achieved in our culprit-absent conditions. Under clear retrieval conditions, 
E' was equal to 2.47 and under degraded retrieval conditions E' was equal to 3.65. Hence, 
our culprit-absent lineups were moderately fair. 
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Experiment 2 Results 
Table 2 displays the proportions of witnesses who identified the culprit, identified 
an innocent person, and made no identification as functions of culprit presence and lineup 
clarity conditions.  
Identification decision accuracy. As in Experiment 1, we used a hierarchical 
binary logistic regression analysis to examine the impact of video quality, culprit-
presence, and the interaction term on identification decision accuracy. Decision accuracy 
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was coded as in Experiment 1, where culprit identifications from the culprit-present 
lineup and correct rejections from the culprit-removed lineup were treated as accurate 
(accuracy = 1) and all other identification decisions were treated as inaccurate (accuracy 
= 0). Neither culprit-presence nor the interaction term between culprit-presence and 
lineup quality significantly predicted identification accuracy, Bs ≤ .99, SEs ≥ .30, Wald’s 
χ2(1) ≤ 2.65, ps ≥ .10, eB ≤ 2.69.  Identification accuracy did vary by lineup quality; the 
odds ratio for accurate identification decisions was 6.70 times greater for the clear versus 
the degraded lineup, B = 1.94, SE = .30, Wald’s χ2(1) = 41.80, p <.001, eB =6.70 (95% CI 
[ 3.87, 12.55]). As in Experiment 1, although the interaction term was not significant, our 
prediction was that degraded encoding conditions would decrease accuracy in both 
culprit-present and culprit-absent identification procedures. Accordingly, we proceeded 
to examine the simple slopes of encoding conditions as a function of culprit presence. 
When the culprit was present, the odds ratio for culprit-present accurate identification 
decisions was 11.68 times greater for the clear than versus the degraded lineup, B = 2.46, 
SE = .45, Wald’s χ2(1) = 29.72, p <.001, eB = 11.68, (95% CI [4.83, 28.26]). Likewise, 
when the culprit was removed, the odds ratio for culprit-removed accurate identification 
decisions was 4.35 times greater for the clear versus the degraded lineup, B = 1.47, SE = 
.41, Wald’s χ2(1) = 13.09, p <.001, eB = 4.35, (95% CI [1.96, 9.64]).  
Analyses of type of error in culprit-present conditions. Because there are two 
ways in which a participant viewing the culprit-present condition can make an error (a 
false rejection or a mistaken identification of an innocent person), we next examined 
whether false rejections and mistaken identifications from culprit-present lineups differed 
as a function of video quality. There was a significant effect of video quality on mistaken 
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identifications in the culprit-present conditions; the odds ratio for culprit-present 
mistaken identifications of innocent persons was 5.48 times greater for the degraded 
versus the clear lineup, B = 1.70, SE = .51, Wald’s χ2(1) =11.18, p =.001, eB =5.48, (95% 
CI [2.02, 14.84]). Likewise, the odds ratio for culprit-present false rejections was 3.69 
times greater for the degraded versus the clear lineup, B = 1.31, SE = .45, Wald’s χ2(1) 
=8.37, p = .004, eB = 3.69, (95% CI [1.52, 8.92]).  
Table 2. Identification decisions in Experiment 2: Clear vs. degraded retrieval conditions 
Clear lineup Degraded lineup 
Culprit-
present 
Culprit ID 73.2% 19.0% 
Innocent ID 10.7% 39.7% 
No ID 16.1% 41.4% 
Culprit-
removed 
Innocent ID 38.6% 73.2% 
No ID 61.4% 26.8% 
Confidence. As in Experiment 1, we used a hierarchical binary logistic regression 
analysis to examine whether confidence could discriminate between accurate and 
inaccurate identification decisions and whether this effect was dependent on the presence 
of the culprit, the quality of retrieval conditions, or the three-way interaction term. As 
eyewitness confidence increased, so to did the odds of making a correct identification 
decision, B = 0.16, SE = 0.07, Wald's χ2(1) = 5.83, p = .02, eB = 1.17, (95% CI [1.03, 
1.33]). The three-way interaction among certainty, retrieval conditions, and culprit 
presence was not significant, B = 0.04, SE = 0.29, Wald's χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .89, eB = 1.04, 
(95% CI [0.59, 1.83]); however, as in Experiment 1, the discriminative properties of 
eyewitness confidence were dependent on both the quality of retrieval conditions, B = .28 
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SE = 0.14, Wald's χ2(1) = 3.81, p = .051, eB = 1.32, (95% CI [0.999, 1.74]) and on the 
presence of the culprit, B = 0.43, SE = 0.14, Wald's χ2(1) = 8.98, p = .003, eB = 1.54, 
(95% CI [1.16, 2.04]).  
To follow up the interaction between confidence and retrieval conditions, we 
examined the simple slopes of confidence separately for clear and degraded retrieval 
conditions. When retrieval conditions were clear, increases in confidence predicted 
increases in accuracy, B = 0.29, SE = 0.09, Wald's χ2(1) = 9.44, p = .002, eB = 1.33, (95% 
CI [1.11, 1.60]); however, when retrieval conditions were degraded, confidence was not 
significantly related to accuracy, B = 0.01, SE = 0.10, Wald's χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .91, eB = 
1.01, (95% CI [0.84, 1.22]). We used the same approach to follow up the significant 
interaction between confidence and culprit presence. When the culprit was present, 
increases in confidence predicted increases in accuracy, B = 0.51, SE = 0.10, Wald's χ2(1) 
= 27.41, p < .001, eB = 1.66, (95% CI [1.37, 2.01]); however, when the culprit was absent 
confidence was not significantly associated with accuracy, B = 0.12, SE = 0.07, Wald's 
χ2(1) = 2.41, p = .12, eB = 1.12, (95% CI [0.97, 1.30]). 
General Discussion 
The above experiments demonstrate two important phenomena: (1) that the 
strength-based mirror effect generalizes to the eyewitness identification context, and (2) 
that witness decision criteria are malleable at the time of the lineup task. We have shown 
that a weak sense of recognition lowers eyewitnesses’ decision criteria regardless of 
whether the weak sense of recognition is due to poor encoding conditions or due to noisy 
retrieval conditions. Although there is a lot of evidence that people will set a lower 
decision criterion on a recognition task if the encoding conditions are poor (e.g., 
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Lampinen et al., 2014; Stretch & Wixted, 1998), there are only a handful of studies from 
the basic recognition literature that have examined how poor retrieval conditions impact 
decision criteria (Hockley et al., 1998; Kent et al., 2018). Experiment 2 is the first lineup 
experiment to demonstrate that degraded retrieval conditions lead witnesses to lower their 
decision criteria. At a theoretical level, the results of Experiment 2 indicate that the 
decision criteria that eyewitnesses use for a lineup are influenced by the match-to-
memory experience on the lineup task. That is, regardless of why an eyewitness’ 
experience leads them to feel as though none of lineup members is a good match their 
memory of the culprit, the weak recognition experience itself leads them to lower the 
amount of evidence required for an identification. 
The magnitude of the effects observed in these two experiments are quite 
remarkable. In Experiment 1, the mistaken identification rate increased from 21% for the 
clear-viewing conditions to 57% for the degraded-viewing conditions. Likewise, in 
Experiment 2, the mistaken identification rate increased from 39% in the clear culprit-
absent lineup to 73% in the degraded culprit-absent lineup. Clearly, decreasing the 
number of high-quality cues available to the eyewitness had a drastic impact on the 
mistaken identification rate. 
The most profound theoretical implication of these results is that they provide 
indirect support for the present-absent criteria discrepancy theory (Smith et al., 2018). 
Past research has demonstrated that manipulations of decision criterion can decrease 
innocent-suspect identifications to a greater extent than culprit identifications (Eisen, 
Smith, Olaguez, & Skerritt-Perta, 2017; Smith et al., 2018). Other research has shown 
that witnesses who encounter culprit-absent procedures report having had worse encoding 
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conditions than do witnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures (Bradfield et al., 
2002). Both of these patterns are consistent with present-absent criteria discrepancy, but 
connecting either of these effects to present-absent criteria discrepancy requires one to 
assume that decision criteria are malleable during a lineup task. Experiment 2 provides 
strong support for the assumption that witnesses’ decision criteria are not fixed prior to 
observing the lineup but instead are influenced by the lineup itself. Indeed, witness-
participants who viewed a degraded lineup set their decision criteria lower than did 
participants who viewed a clear lineup, as evidenced by the increase in false 
identifications of innocent persons when the lineup was degraded. Because the clear-
lineup and degraded-lineup conditions were identical up until the lineup task, it is clear 
that the criterion-changing effect occurred during the identification task.  
The current findings add to growing evidence that the mere absence of the culprit 
from a lineup leads witnesses to set a lower decision criterion. After all, removing the 
culprit from the lineup produces an all-noise situation that would be expected to mimic 
what happens when the lineup images are degraded by noise (i.e., lowering of the 
decision criterion). Notice the strong parallelism in Experiment 2 for what happens to 
false alarms when the culprit-present lineup is made noisy (false alarms go from 10.7% to 
39.7%), and what happens when the lineup images are clear but the culprit is removed 
(false alarms from 10.7% to 38.6%). It makes sense that weakening the recognition 
experience by removing the culprit from the lineup would have the same type of effect 
(lowering decision criteria) as weakening the recognition experience by degrading the 
lineup images. Indeed, these are two different ways to operationalize a weak match-to-
memory. 
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Prior to present-absent criteria discrepancy hypothesis, our theories and models of 
eyewitness identification had assumed that the decision criterion that eyewitnesses use 
for culprit-present lineups is the same criterion that they use for culprit-absent lineups 
(e.g., Clark, 2003; Wixted & Mickes, 2014). Implicit in the idea that witnesses who 
encounter culprit-absent lineups use the same decision criteria as witnesses who 
encounter culprit-present lineups is the assumption that decision criteria are uninfluenced 
by the match-to-memory experience on the lineup task. The results of Experiment 2 
demonstrate that this assumption is erroneous. Degrading the quality of photos on the 
lineup task led to an increase in false alarms. Clearly, degrading photos did not make the 
lineup members a better match to the witnesses’ memories for the culprit. Instead, 
degrading the photos increased false alarm rates because the degraded match to memory 
led witnesses to lower their criteria for identification.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Differentiation versus Criterion Shift Accounts. Overall, these data are consistent 
with the idea that eyewitnesses set a lower decision criterion when the recognition 
experience at test is weak rather than strong, regardless of whether the weak recognition 
experience is due to poor encoding conditions or degraded retrieval conditions. There is, 
however, a potential alternative account of why false alarms increase when encoding and 
retrieval conditions are impoverished. The differentiation account (e.g., Criss, 2006; 
2009) postulates that poor encoding conditions result in a memory representation that has 
more potential to be confused with (or is more difficult to differentiate from) a similar 
foil than when encoding conditions are good. Although the differentiation account has 
focused primarily on good versus poor encoding, this account could easily be extended to 
WEAK MEMORY LEADS WITNESSES TO LOWER THEIR CRITERIA	 31	
good versus poor retrieval conditions. Indeed, an extension of the differentiation account 
would postulate that poor retrieval conditions result in a memory representation that has 
more potential to be confused with a similar foil than when retrieval conditions are good. 
We cannot definively rule out the differentiation account. In effect, however, the 
differentiation account postulates that the increase in false alarms from poor encoding or 
retrieval conditions is due to an increase in witnesses’ perceived similarity (reduced 
ability to detect dissimilarities) between their memory of the culprit and a similar foil 
rather than due to a lowering of decision criterion. Both accounts predict a rise in false 
alarms when enfcoding and retrieval conditions are degraded. However, it is not clear 
why the differentiation account would predict that witnesses’ confidence in their false 
alarms would be reduced by poor encoding and retrieval conditions. The lowering of 
criterion account, in contrast, clearly predicts that the increased false alarms from poor 
encoding and retrieval conditions will be made with lower confidence, which is what the 
current experiments found. Of course, some version of the differentiation hypothesis 
might be able to explain this reduction in confidence. At this point, however, we agree 
with the dominant interpretation in the basic literature that these strength-based mirror 
effects are the result of changes in decision criteria (e.g., Wixted & Gaiten, 2002). 
Re-evaluating eyewitness decision strategies. The findings from the present 
experiments have interesting implications for eyewitness decision strategies that have 
been implemented with the WITNESS model (Clark, 2003). Many of the different 
decision rules that have historically been implemented in the WITNESS model should be 
re-evaluated in light of strength-based mirror effect data. For example, in the introduction 
of this paper, we noted that one relative-judgment strategy assumes that witnesses only 
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make an identification if the best-matching lineup member is a sufficiently better match-
to-memory than are all remaining lineup members (Clark et al., 2011). Clearly, degrading 
either encoding or retrieval conditions (as we did in Experiments 1 and 2) makes the 
recognition task more difficult. And, when recognition tasks become more difficult, the 
extent to which a witness prefers one lineup member over the rest should also decrease 
(because everyone is starting to look more like "noise"). Yet, this did not lead witnesses 
to "back off" from making an identification. Rather, degrading either encoding or 
recognition conditions led to a sharp increase in false-positive identifications. In order to 
explain this pattern of results, the aforementioned relative-judgment strategy would need 
to assume not just that witnesses lowered their criteria for making an affirmative 
identification, but that witnesses lowered their criterion for what they consider a 
sufficiently better match-to-memory. This assumption may or may not be plausible, but 
our purpose is not to evaluate the viability of this particular assumption. Our purpose here 
is to shed some light on how the WITNESS model might leverage strength-based mirror 
effect data in order to discriminate among the large number of lineup decision strategies 
that have been examined in past works (e.g., Clark et al., 2011).  
Another interesting implication for the WITNESS model is that these data clearly 
demonstrate that eyewitness decision criteria are malleable during the recognition task. 
To date, the WITNESS model has assumed that decision criteria are set in advance of the 
recognition task and do not change during the recognition task. The data from 
Experiment 2 clearly demonstrate that decision criteria are maeable during the 
recognition task. This introduces a new theoretical complexity that researchers will have 
to consider in future implementations of the WITNESS model.  
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Conclusion 
In two experiments we have demonstrated that the strength-based mirror effect 
extends to eyewitness identification contexts. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this 
research is what it reveals about the malleability of eyewitnesses’ decision criteria. 
Eyewitnesses do not necessarily set their criterion prior to the lineup task, or if they do, 
this criterion is malleable during the lineup task. If the lineup provides a weak match-to-
memory experience, eyewitnesses will lower their criterion for making a positive 
identification. While previous research has demonstrated that poor encoding can 
influence decision criterion, we show that degrading lineup photographs at retrieval 
produces the same effect. It would seem that any manipulation that results in a witness 
having a weak match-to-memory experience on a lineup task leads the witness to lower 
her criterion for making an affirmative identification. One way to give a witness a weak 
match-to-memory experience on a lineup task is to remove the culprit from the lineup 
procedure. To the extent that witnesses react to the absence of the culprit in the same 
manner that they react to other sources of a weak match-to-memory, we would expect 
witnesses who encounter culprit-absent procedures to have a lower criterion for making 
an affirmative identification than do witnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures. 
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